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Abstract: Preserving location privacy is increasingly an essential concern in Vehicular Adhoc Net-
works (VANETs). Vehicles broadcast beacon messages in an open form that contains information
including vehicle identity, speed, location, and other headings. An adversary may track the various
locations visited by a vehicle using sensitive information transmitted in beacons such as vehicle
identity and location. By matching the vehicle identity used in beacon messages at various locations,
an adversary learns the location history of a vehicle. This compromises the privacy of the vehicle
driver. In existing research work, pseudonyms are used in place of the actual vehicle identity in the
beacons. Pseudonyms should be changed regularly to safeguard the location privacy of vehicles.
However, applying simple change in pseudonyms does not always provide location privacy. Existing
schemes based on mix zones operate efficiently in higher traffic environments but fail to provide
privacy in lower vehicle traffic densities. In this paper, we take the problem of location privacy in
diverse vehicle traffic densities. We propose a new Crowd-based Mix Context (CMC) privacy scheme
that provides location privacy as well as identity protection in various vehicle traffic densities. The
pseudonym changing process utilizes context information of road such as speed, direction and the
number of neighbors in transmission range for the anonymisation of vehicles, adaptively updating
pseudonyms based on the number of a vehicle neighbors in the vicinity. We conduct formal modeling
and specification of the proposed scheme using High-Level Petri Nets (HPLN). Simulation results
validate the effectiveness of CMC in terms of location anonymisation, the probability of vehicle
traceability, computation time (cost) and effect on vehicular applications.
Keywords: anonymity; formal modeling; location privacy; mix context; pseudonyms; traceabil-
ity; VANETs
1. Introduction
With the growth of wireless technology and intelligent transportation systems, vehic-
ular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are attracting significant attention. Current goals are to
make the ad-hoc network more efficient, secure and provide comfort to passenger on the
road [1]. The main concern is to provide information regarding traffic congestion, collision
notification, emergency, location services, weather conditions, and so on. VANETs can
improve road safety and relief of vehicle drivers on the road. Traffic related information is
analyzed and shared by vehicles in the network. VANETs is a subclass of mobile ad-hoc net-
works, which provide communication facilities to nearby vehicles in the road environment,
which makes it different from others due to characteristics such as dynamic road topology,
communication, sensing capabilities and transmission power for vehicles’ function [2].
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The basic architecture of vehicular networks consists of Road Side Units (RSU), On-
Board Units (OBU), Event Data Recorders (EDR), various sensors, and navigation systems
(such as GPS) [3]. RSUs are a road infrastructure that increase the communication connec-
tivity to vehicles. The OBU is fixed in the vehicle with a temper proof device that protects
the cryptographic credentials of vehicles. This is used for wireless communication among
vehicles and with infrastructure [4]. An EDR archives various events of vehicles communi-
cation during a trip on the road. GPS can be used to provide geographical location, vehicle
speed, movement direction, and acceleration for a specific time interval [5]. Obstacles on
the road are detected with the aid of radar and sensors. In-vehicle, an omnidirectional
antenna is fixed for wireless channel access in the network.
The deployment of onboard units permits communication among nearby vehicles and
fixed road infrastructure, which make possible three communication models, i.e., Vehicle
to Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I), and hybrid communication model [3,6].
In the V2V model, there is no support of infrastructure and vehicles are communicated
directly. For data and information gathering, vehicles communicate with road side infras-
tructure through the V2I model. In the hybrid model, vehicles do not communicate with
infrastructure directly but communicate in a single or multihop manner, depending on
the transmission range of vehicles. This enables long-distance communication between
vehicles in the network. Various wireless technologies are suggested for communication
in vehicular networks, such Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC), Cellular
network, WiMax, WiFi, and VeMAC protocol [6,7]. Among the existing technologies, DSRC
has the potential for use in wide range variety of applications, including collision avoidance
which can save thousands of lives and billions of dollars annually [8].
The mobile node (vehicle) in a network can broadcast Basic Safety Messages (BSMs),
Cooperative Aware Messages (CAM) or beacons to disseminate road environment informa-
tion. The beacon message’s contents consist of vehicle identity, velocity, position, and other
information [9]. The vehicle broadcasts beacon messages in plaintext format, and so other
entities in the network are able to learn the actual identity and location of vehicles by ana-
lyzing these beacon messages. Similarly, an adversary can obtain the personal information
of a vehicle driver by collecting beacon messages and tracking the various locations visited,
thus coming to know the behavior and activities of the vehicle driver. This has the potential
to pose several types of threat to the vehicle driver, such as damage to social reputation,
physical harassment, blackmailing, and property loss [10]. To protect the privacy of the
vehicle, pseudonyms can be used in place of the real identity in the message, and this is
a commonly accepted solution. The pseudonym is an alias or randomized identity of a
vehicle inserted in the beacon message. However, the use of fixed pseudo-identity is not
suitable for protecting the privacy of a vehicle, and it must be changed over time to guard
against the linking the pseudonym of a vehicle over time.
For the protection of vehicle location privacy, various pseudonym-changing strategies
have been proposed in the literature. Some techniques use the concept of a mix zone [11–15]
to hide the vehicle identities in a zone created by the vehicle to change pseudonyms coop-
eratively. However, the performance of the mix zone is degraded in conditions of lower
traffic density [16]. Techniques based on group signatures are introduced [17–20] to protect
location privacy of vehicles in which the broadcast beacons are signed with a key assigned
to a group to protect the identity of a vehicle in a group. However, the management of
signatures in the group administratively burdensome [16]; large groups have difficulty
with managing signatures while small group size impacts privacy protection. Schemes
based on a silent period [21–23] can hide the identity of vehicles. However, these schemes
have a detrimental effect for road safety applications. To overcome the onward limita-
tions of existing schemes, we propose a novel scheme, the Crowd-based Mix Context
(CMC) method that efficiently provides location privacy protection under diverse vehicle
traffic conditions.
The existing pseudonym changing scheme, Ref. [24] addresses the problem of loca-
tion privacy in mix zones under lower traffic density. It uses a concept of creating fake
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pseudonyms to anonymize the vehicle in the concerned region. However, generating fake
pseudonyms in large quantities impact VANET applications and create computational
overheads for the vehicle OBU. If a single-vehicle creates fake pseudonyms for anonymity
purposes, the attacker may be able to find similarities in beacon messages, to ascertain that
only one vehicle is on the road. Furthermore, fake pseudonyms create a liability issue in
the network. The work undertaken in [25] is based on both mix zones and silent periods,
where a large number of vehicles gather and anonymize identities in silent mode. However,
while this works well in an urban scenario that consists of a higher number of vehicles, it
is not consistent in the case of lower congested areas such as highways in which vehicles
may rarely change pseudonyms [26].
Therefore, to preserve the location privacy of a vehicle, there is a need for an efficient
approach that works under various traffic density conditions and also provides privacy
outside mix zone areas. In this paper, we propose a distributed scheme CMC that offers
privacy protection to vehicles in VANETs. In this paper, the terms network, road network,
vehicular network, vehicular communication network and VANETs denote interchangeably
and they all refer to vehicular ad-hoc networks. Our contributions in this paper are
given below.
1. We introduce a virtual pseudonym exchange suitable method for a low number of ve-
hicles in transmission range. This will mix vehicle identities to provide anonymisation
to a target vehicle in that region.
2. Efficiently utilize the diverse traffic density according to the road context information
to hide location privacy of a vehicle.
3. We utilize the road network context for the protection of location privacy, which
reduces its impacts on road network applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains details of the existing
literature on location privacy schemes. System models and goals are discussed in Section 3.
The proposed solution is explained in Section 4. Formal modeling and specification of
the proposed model are given in Section 5. Section 6 provides details of the experimental
setup and evaluation criteria for location privacy. In Sections 7 and 8, we discuss the per-
formance analysis and comparison of the proposed scheme, respectively. Finally, the paper
is concluded in Section 10.
2. Related Work
As mentioned, a pseudonym can be used in beacon messages, rather than the real
identity of a vehicle, as a means to provide privacy. However, some limited knowledge
of the whereabouts of a vehicle means that the pseudonym of a vehicle can be identified,
and all journeys of that vehicle can be recovered. For this reason, pseudonyms are changed
periodically. However, simple pseudonym-exchange schemes may suffer from pseudonym
linkability. That is, an adversary can discover the relationship between pseudonyms
and hence recover vehicle journeys. Several schemes of pseudonym changing are proposed
and tested in the literature; here, we review some of these. A taxonomy of location privacy
schemes is shown in Figure 1. Table 1 contains details of a comparative analysis of existing
schemes in a vehicular network.
A group navigation, in combination with a random silence period, is proposed in [21].
The vehicle remains silent, not broadcasting beacons in the network for a random period
to avoid linkability. The vehicles are restricted to forming groups on the road, and the
group leader will broadcast messages while other members of the group remain silent.
Similarly, an advanced version is presented in [27] again using the combination of silent
periods with the group formation concept. The vehicles remain silent if a certain low-speed
threshold is met (below 30 km/h) and should change pseudonyms during this period as
given in [28]. This means that a vehicle will not broadcast heartbeat messages at slow
speeds, with the justification that the possibility of an accident during lower speeds is
low. In [29], a safe-distance metric is used to find an obfuscation radius in which the
value of velocity, position, and direction is perturbed to enhance the privacy of vehicles.
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In addition, if a vehicle did not find any other vehicle within a safe distance, it remains silent
to preclude tracking. An autonomous pseudonym update mechanism is presented in [23],
which takes the speed and direction as parameters. If a certain traffic weight threshold is
met, the vehicle will update its pseudonym in a silent mode, otherwise the vehicle waits
for one more silent period. In the context-based scheme, the vehicle adaptively enters
and exits from a silent period, changing the pseudonym based on the number of silent
neighboring vehicles [30]. A similar scheme is introduced in [31] in which vehicle changes
its pseudonym based on the context of silent neighbors. It also assesses the presence of
misbehaving vehicles in the network and checks the success of the pseudonym changing
process. Another scheme is based on a silent period that uses the concept of permutation to
exchange pseudonyms between vehicles to create confusion for an adversary attempting
location identification [32]. Silent period-based schemes have certain limitations, i.e., it
impacts road network applications, the management of silent period duration for a vehicle
trip is difficult to utilize for location protection: the use of a short silent period can provide
one way to measure the effectiveness of a pseudonym linkability attack, while, for a long
silence period, the knowledge of spatial and temporal relationship makes it possible for an
adversary to track the vehicle [33].
Figure 1. Categories of location privacy schemes.
A group communication method with a random encryption period is introduced
in [20,34] for location privacy in VANETs. The scheme increases the confusion of the exter-
nal attacker by creating an encryption zone around a vehicle’s OBU. Another synchronized
pseudonym changing protocol is proposed in [35] to provide unlinkability of the vehicle
location tracks. The main aim is to break the spatial and temporal relationship of the vehicle
pseudonyms. A data forwarding protocol is used in [36] for location privacy based on the
social behavior of a vehicle driver. The social behavior of vehicles is collected from visiting
social spots, i.e., shopping malls, intersections, and museums. If a vehicle visits a social
spot, it can retrieve messages from RSU anonymously. The protocol achieves two things
in parallel, i.e., preserves the location privacy and provides reliable transmission in the
network. In [18], the concept of a cryptographic mix zone is used to hide the location
information of vehicles that are based on one-time identity-based authentication. It has no
dependency on trusted party, and the keys are updated within the zone. Any vehicle in
the group may be a group key distributor in the cryptographic zone. A revocable group
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signature scheme is proposed in [37] for location privacy based on the Chinese remainder
theorem and digital signature algorithm. It protects the anonymity of the vehicle as well
as providing traceability to TA in case of a dispute of signature. However, the group
signature method has certain issues regarding the management of signatures in the group.
The signature of a large group is difficult to manage, while smaller groups affect the pri-
vacy protection level [33]. In [38], a dynamic grouping and virtual pseudonym exchange
scheme is proposed in which diverse traffic conditions are utilized to update pseudonyms
of vehicles for location protection.
Some techniques employ dummy data or inaccurate data to generate confusion for
an adversary to identify the real location of a vehicle. In such a case, a perturbation
algorithm is proposed in [39] that utilizes the reported position of two users at proximity
and slightly modifies their position to create confusion for an adversary. The inaccurate
beacon message is sent in between the periodic actual beacon messages to break the link
between various locations of vehicles [40]. Dummy locations are generated in [41] for
privacy protection of vehicles. In [42], the location of the neighboring vehicle is taken
as a virtual shadow and sends two requests to LBS with two different locations. It will
hide the actual location of a target vehicle from the location attacker. Similarly, virtual
position points are generated in [43] that bridge between user and LBS. The sensitivity-
based pseudonym changing scheme is introduced in [44] that takes regularities in vehicle
movements to achieve personalised vehicle location protection. A new concept of multilevel
obfuscation scheme is introduced in [45] to protect the location privacy of vehicles while
communicating with LBS. The vehicle generates duplicate messages in connection with the
surrounding vehicle to increase vehicle identity anonymisation in the vicinity. The concept
of differential privacy and pseudonym permutation is used in [46] to hide the location
trajectory of the vehicle. The trajectory of the user is divided into coarse-grained and
fine-grained under the personalized user privacy requirements. Similarly, a new technique
is introduced in [47] that protects the user’s semantic location trajectory. It uses the concept
of reinforcement learning based on differential privacy that randomizes the locations of
the vehicle’s trajectory. The optimized obfuscation policy is used in terms of privacy
improvement and the loss of quality of the services. The obfuscation and hiding in the
crowd concept are combined in [48] to increase confusion for an adversary trying to link
vehicles’ pseudonyms. The dummy-based location privacy scheme improves the level
of privacy to some extent. However, there are certain problems related to these schemes,
including management of dummy data being an issue, their impact on the quality of
services, and generating overhead in the network.
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Table 1. Comparative analysis of location privacy schemes in VANETs.
Ref. Method Adversary Model Mode of Execution Accountability Preserve VANETs Applications Privacy Metrics Cost (Time, Computation, Communication)
[49] Cooperative General adversary Infrastructure less No No Protection rate Not given
[13] Mix zone GPA Infrastructure based No No ASS, Location privacy gain Reduced
[14] Random selection Passive adversary Infrastructure based No No ASS Increased
[50] Silent mode Global passive adversary Infrastructure less No No ASS, entropy, tracking probability Reduced
[32] Scheme permutation Global passive adversary Infrastructure less Yes Yes ASS, traceability, confusion, entropy Not computed
[24] Dummy data External global attacker Infrastructure less No No Anonymity Reduced
[12] Cheating detection Global passive adversary Infrastructure based No No ASS, entropy, attacker probability Not mentioned
[30] Silent mode Global passive adversary Infrastructure less No Yes Anonymity, Traceability Not mentioned
[31] Silent mode Global passive adversary Infrastructure less No Yes ASS, entropy, traceability Not computed
[9] Triggered based External passive adversary Infrastructure less Yes Yes Anonymity, entropy, Tracking percentage, Not computed
[51] Dummy data Global passive adversary Infrastructure less No Yes ASS, entropy, tracking probability Not computed
[42] Route confusion General attacker Infrastructure based No No ASS, entropy, traceability Not mentioned
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A mix zone scheme is proposed in [52] which considers context information to
change pseudonyms. The context information may be the number of neighbors, direction,
and speed. The vehicles will find suitable opportunities to blend and be an anonymisation
set with vehicles having similar properties. Julien et al. proposed to create mix zones at
suitable areas to protect the location information of vehicles [53]. The privacy of vehi-
cles in the mix zone is improved in [54] with the help of using a cryptographic concept.
Here, the vehicle shares the status information only with neighboring vehicles. In [13],
the pseudonym changing strategy is applied at a social spot which may be a road intersec-
tion or shopping malls, where several vehicles gather. The social spot becomes a mix zone
to hide vehicle identities. The vehicles form a mix zone dynamically in [55] to guard against
the linking of an old pseudonym to the new one. The messages of vehicles are encrypted
in the zone. A similar scheme, introduced in [56], creates a mix zone dynamically and
changes pseudonym based on the vehicle candidate location list. Abdelwahab et al. [57]
introduced the concept of a silent mix zone, in which vehicles remain silent at the roadside
intersection. An improvement is made in [15] to build an urban pseudonym changing
strategy in silent zones; the vehicles exchange their pseudonyms in the silent zone.
Reputation-based schemes are proposed in [58,59] and these encourage the “selfish”
vehicle behavior for pseudonym changing in the mix zone to protect location privacy.
Pseudonym management and changing techniques are introduced in [60], where vehicles
create a privacy zone at roadside infrastructure. The level of privacy protection is sub-
ject to a number of vehicles in the zone. In [61], a secure mix zone is created based on
spatial and temporal factors. It has been shown that a temporal factor shift improves the
privacy of vehicles. The virtual mix zone is created dynamically based on the expiry of
pseudonyms [62]. A reputation model is also presented to encourage selfish vehicles to
join the zone. The dynamic pseudonym changing technique proposed in [16] constructs
multiple mix zones in the network. The privacy of the mobile object is protected with
the help of the cryptographic methods in the communication. In [11], mix zones are
planted at specific regions where vehicles change pseudonyms to hide their identities for
the protection of vehicle privacy. A de-correlation privacy scheme is proposed in [63] that
creates multiple mix zones in parking lots and traffic places. It achieves a high level of
privacy protection of vehicle trajectory. Despite the useful features of the mix zone-based
location privacy techniques, there are certain limitations. Firstly, in the mix zone, the level
of privacy is degraded when operating in lower traffic density environments [17]. Secondly,
privacy is provided to vehicles within the zone, and there is no privacy protection outside
it. Thirdly, if the zones are deployed at fixed regions, only these areas provide the privacy
protection and deployment costs increase the need to build a large number of zones with
infrastructure support in the road network area.
Based on problems and limitations in the existing schemes for location privacy in a ve-
hicular network, we propose a novel scheme using a crowd-based mix context that utilizes
the diverse nature of vehicle traffic densities. The pseudonyms changing process depends
on the number of neighbors in the transmission range and road context information. This
improves the anonymisation of a target vehicle (a vehicle that an adversary wants to locate)
in a crowd of similar-status vehicles in a concerned region.
3. Models and Goals
In this section, we discuss the system model and the adversary model. After that,
the goals of this research work are explained. The first subsection provides a details
of the entities used in the system model. The second subsection discusses assumptions
about the strength of an adversary, and in the last subsection, we discuss the goals of the
research work.
3.1. System Model
The system model is comprised of three things, namely the Trusted Authority (TA),
RSU, and Vehicles. The depiction of the system model is shown in Figure 2. The Trusted
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Authority (or certification authority or Government Authority) is assumed to be honest and
will not take part in compromising vehicle location [62,63]. The vehicle must be registered
with the TA before joining the ad hoc network. The TA provides a pseudonym pool to
vehicles to be used for a number of days. The pseudonym is used for anonymous broadcast
of beacon messages. On the expiry of its pseudonym pool, the vehicle can request another
pseudonym pool from the TA. We assume that the vehicle has been registered with TA
and is assigned a pseudonym pool. An RSU is a roadside infrastructure fixed on the road
to increase the communication range of vehicles. It is a semi-honest entity in the system
model, and it may or may not compromise the privacy of a vehicle. RSUs also play a role
in the dissemination of data to other entities of the system model. We also assume that the
authentication process is performed by each vehicle. The vehicle contains an OBU that is
used for communication with other OBUs and infrastructure in the network. OBU records
communication events of vehicles. The vehicle has a tamper-proof device that stores the
key materials securely, such as anonymous identities and records of all communication
events [64]. The vehicle is also equipped with GPS for precise location updates.
Figure 2. Basic system model.
3.2. Adversary Model
We assume a Global Passive Adversary (GPA) in this work. The detail of the adversary
model is shown in Figure 3. The aim of the GPA is to track various locations to identify the
journeys of a target vehicle in the network. In this model, we make various assumptions
about the GPA. The GPA can deploy a low-cost radio transceiver to intercept broadcast
beacon messages in the region of interest. The contents of the beacon message are pseudo-
identity, speed, location, direction, and other headings. The adversary can capture a large
portion of the network to catch the messages exchanged between vehicles. It can track the
various locations of a vehicle with the help of eavesdropping vehicle communication [22].
It also has the ability to capture the pseudonyms of vehicles and can link the various
pseudonyms of a vehicle used during a trip. The adversary captures beacon messages to
try to correlate the old pseudonym with the newly changed pseudonym. By matching the
different pseudonyms of a vehicle at different locations, the adversary gets knowledge of
the target vehicle’s behavior and could predict a vehicle’s future locations.
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Figure 3. Adversary model.
3.3. Goals
Our primary concern in this research work is to achieve a high level of location privacy
in a vehicular network. For this purpose, various factors and parameters are required.
The factors include vehicle speed, traffic density, moving direction, and other road context
information. The following goals are set to be achieved in this research work:
1. Location anonymisation at diverse vehicle traffic conditions.
2. Virtual pseudonym exchange process to protect location under low traffic conditions.
3. Dynamic mix context zone creation based on different road parameters such as vehicle
speed, direction, and traffic density.
4. The pseudonym change and exchange process are based on the road context information.
5. Preventing an adversary from linking various pseudonyms of a vehicle at different
location spots.
6. Reducing the impact of privacy protection on the efficacy of road network applications.
4. Proposed Solution
We propose a crowd-based mix context scheme which offers location privacy to
vehicles in a vehicular network. The scheme comprises two cases based on the vehicle
speed, direction, and traffic density. The first case in our proposed scheme is the road
intersection or the situation in which vehicles have low speed and traffic congestion on the
road. In the second case, vehicles have low speed and fewer neighbors within transmission
range. We use a mix context method to hide the actual identity of the vehicle in a crowd.
A crowd of vehicles of similar status neighboring vehicles is established where they mix
their context and identities to blur the sensitive information of vehicles. Here, context
means a vehicles’ direction of movement, speed range, and the number of transmission
range neighboring vehicles. The proposed scheme block diagram is shown in Figure 4.
The vehicle senses the environment to find the number of neighboring vehicles in its range.
Based on the road context information, vehicles change pseudonyms to mix it in the crowd
of vehicles. Otherwise, the virtual crowd method is used to mix the identities of vehicles.
In the first case, there is a higher number of neighboring vehicles in the vicinity, and the
simple pseudonym changing process is used, while in the second case, there is a lower
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number of neighboring vehicles in the transmission range, so the target vehicle selects
neighboring vehicles randomly to exchange pseudonyms with. In both of these cases, there
is a need for the protection of location privacy of vehicles. The whole process of the crowd-
based mix context procedure is explained with the help of Algorithm 1. DenThreshold
is the vehicle traffic threshold and NeigThreshold is the number of transmission range
vehicles in the vicinity of a target vehicle. The high-level flowchart of the mix context
scheme is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 4. The block diagram of vehicles context mixing.
Figure 5. The high-level flow of the mix context method.
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Algorithm 1 Crowd-based Mix Context.
Initialization: Vi: Any vehicle i, Tx: Transmission range, DenThreshold: Density threshold,
NeigThreshold: Neighbor threshold, VD: Vehicle density, SPR: Speed range, LatencyBroad:
Beacon broadcast latency, D: Direction of vehicle
Input: SPR, D, DenThreshold, Tx
Output: Successful pseudonym update process
1: for Vi = 1→ n do
2: NeighborFunction(SPR, D, Tx)
3: if VD ≥ DenThreshold then
4: Wait (TimeLimit)






11: if Neigbhors(Vi) ≥ NeigThreshold then
12: Change pseudonym cooperatively
13: Set PUpdate(Vi) to 0
14: else
15: Randomize selection of Tx neighboring vehicle
16: Select Vj as virtualizer of Vi
17: Exchange Msgs(Vi, Vj)
18: Report Pseudonyms exchanged to TA
19: end if
20: Set timer for pseudonym change Pseudo(t)
21: Expiry of Pseudo(t)
22: Set PUpdate(Vi) to 1
23: Start beacon transmission and wait for at least k context neighbors
24: end for
The neighbor function is used to search and count the number of neighboring vehicles
in the transmission range. The procedure of neighbor function is given in Algorithm 2.
The speed range, transmission range, and distance are given to the algorithm as input.
Algorithm 2 Neighbor Function.
Initialization: Vi: any vehicle i, Tx: Transmission range, SPR: Speed Range, D: Direction
of a vehicle, CountVID: Counting of number of vehicles
Input: SPR, Tx, D
Output: Number of transmission range vehicles (CountVID)
1: for Vi = 1→ n do
2: MessageReceived(Mi)
3: Check(VID, Distance, SPR)
4: Calculate Distance (Vi, Vj)
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4.1. Vehicle High Traffic Density at Low Speed
The vehicles sense the road environment and search for transmission range neighbor-
ing vehicles. In this case, the vehicle neighbor threshold is checked and verified, and based
on the neighbor threshold, the pseudonyms of all vehicles are changed in the crowd. It
mixes the context and pseudonyms of vehicles and confuses an adversary attempting
to identify the vehicle in such a fluxed environment. This concept is shown in Figure 6.
A crowd of vehicles is established when the vehicle’s speed is reduced due to a roadside
intersection or due to some traffic congestion situation occurring on the road. Every ve-
hicle will broadcast a beacon message to ensure its presence in the congested vehicles’
area and inform each neighboring vehicle about the pseudonym change. Each vehicle’s
neighborhood is verified based on the beacon message’s information, i.e., transmission
range, same direction, and same speed range. The vehicle will wait and continuously
search for neighbors until a certain vehicle threshold is reached, when all vehicles start to
change pseudonyms instantaneously. This means that each vehicle changes pseudonyms
in the crowd of vehicles to anonymize itself. The contents of a beacon message include
BM(PID, Tx, V, NeighCount, D, DThresh, PUpdate), where PID is the pseudonym assigned
to the vehicle, Tx is transmission range, V is the speed of the vehicle, NeighCount counts
the number of vehicles in the transmission range, D is the direction of the vehicle, PUpdate
is the updated pseudonym, and DThresh is the vehicle density threshold.
Figure 6. Mixing of context information in the crowd of vehicles.
The main procedure of case 1 is shown in Algorithm 3. The vehicle will monitor
its speed and check neighboring vehicles in its transmission range. If the speed is less
than a certain threshold, the vehicles will set the Pupdate value to 1, which means that
vehicles are ready to change pseudonyms. The vehicles will wait a certain amount of
time if their speed remains low; the broadcast delay of beacon messages is increased.
The delay in the broadcast of beacon messages reduces neighboring vehicles’ burden for
counting the number of vehicles in the vicinity. For pseudonym changing, all vehicles in
the transmission range will change simultaneously and set Pupdate to 0, which means that
the pseudonym has been changed successfully. The pseudonym has a specific expiry time,
and after this time, the flag is set to 1 and waits for another pseudonym change in the best
context situation.
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Algorithm 3 Mix context at higher density.
Initialization: Vi: Any vehicle i, Tx: Transmission range, NeighThreshold: Neighbor thresh-
old, SPR: Speed range, TimeLimit: waiting time limit, D: vehicle direction
Input: SPR, direction, NeighThreshold, Tx
Output: Successful pseudonym change process
1: for Vi = 1→ n do
2: NeighborFunction(SPR, D, Tx)
3: Set PUpdate(Vi) = 1
4: Wait (TimeLimit)
5: if SpeedCheck (lower) then
6: Increase delay in Beacon broadcast
7: else
8: Otherwise normal broadcast
9: end if
10: if Neighbors(Vi) ≥ NeighThreshold then
11: Change pseudonyms simultaneously
12: PUpdate(Vi) set to 0
13: Set timer for pseudonym change Pseudo(t)
14: After expiry of Pseudo(t)
15: PUpdate(Vi) set to 1
16: else
17: Case 2 function
18: end if
19: end for
4.2. Vehicle Low Traffic Density at Low Speed
The second case of the proposed scheme involves low vehicle speed under low-traffic
conditions. In this case, the virtual mix crowd method is used. The virtual crowd method
scans the road environment for neighborhood vehicles in the surroundings, and based on
the context of the vehicle neighbor’s, the virtual pseudonym exchange process is executed.
The target vehicle randomly selects one of the neighboring vehicles to exchange real and
virtual pseudonyms with, as shown in Algorithm 4. Recall the beacon message include
BM(PID, Tx, V, NeighCount, D, DTresh, PUpdate) and is used to sense the vehicle traffic
environment. In the virtual pseudonym exchange scheme, the vehicle randomly selects
one of the transmission range neighbors to exchange pseudonyms and update its PUpdate
attribute. We discuss the virtual pseudonym exchange process with the help of an example.
If vehicle V1 wants to change the pseudonym and has V2, V3, V4, and V5 in its neighbor list.
V1 will randomly select one of the vehicles and start an exchange of pseudonyms with V4.
After completing the exchange process, both vehicles update their status of PUpdate and
publish it to the vehicle’s crowd. Each vehicle that exchanges pseudonyms must report
to the CA the pseudonyms exchanged. This process will reduce the liability issue in the
network. The vehicle generates an image of its real pseudonym and exchanges it with
its neighboring vehicle. The receiving vehicle verifies both of these pseudonyms, accepts
the real one, and rejects the fake pseudonym. The vehicle generates such an image of
a pseudonym that it is difficult for an adversary to identify it. Similarly, other vehicles
such as V2, V3, and V5 also apply the virtual pseudonym exchange process in the vicinity.
As many vehicles take part in the virtual pseudonym exchange process, this produces a
virtual crowd of vehicles in the network, which mixes each vehicle identity and location in
the crowd. The pseudonyms exchange process is shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Virtual pseudonym exchange process between two vehicles.
Algorithm 4 Virtual Mix Context.
Initialization: Vi: Any vehicle i, Tx: Transmission range, NeighThreshold: Neighborhood
threshold, SPR: Speed range, D: Direction of vehicle, LatencyBroad: Beacon broadcast
latency, PUpdate: Pseudonym update value
Input: SPR, D, NeighThreshold, Tx
Output: Pseudonym Exchange process
1: for Vi = 1→ n do
2: NeighborFunction(SPR, D, Tx)
3: if Neighbor(Vi) ≥ NeighThreshold then
4: CallAlgo2()
5: else
6: Set PUpdate(Vi) = 1
7: Increase LatencyBroad(BSMs)
8: end if
9: Randomize selection of a Tx neighboring vehicle
10: select Vj as virtualizer of Vi
11: Exchange Msgs(Vi, Vj)
12: Msg1(PID1, POS1, othercontents)
13: Msg2(PID2, POS2, othercontents)
14: Set PUpdate(Vi) = 0
15: Report Pseudonyms exchanged to TA
16: Set timer for pseudonym change Pseudo(t)
17: After expiry of Pseudo(t)
18: Set PUpdate(Vi) to 1
19: end for
5. Formal Modeling and Specification
High-Level Petri Nets (HLPN) is used for two reasons [65]: to simulate the proposed
model and provide mathematical representation for analyzing the proposed model’s
behavior and structure properties. Formal modeling benefits are the interconnection of
system components and processes, information flow among the processes, and information
processing. We used HLPN for formal modeling and specification of the proposed scheme.
HLPN is a set of seven tuples (P, T, F, ϕ, R, L, M0) as defined in [66].
In this section, we formally model and specify the proposed scheme CMC. We present
the CMC scheme in HLPN in terms of mathematical properties (rules). For the represen-
tation of the system in HLPN, we define places and their associated data types; then, we
specify a set of rules used in HLPN. Tables 2 and 3 contain details of the symbols and places
used in the Petri nets. We design HLPN for Algorithms in the proposed model. Figure 8
shows the HLPN for the mix context scheme. The vertical bar shows transitions, and the
circle shows places used in HLPN. The arrowheads in the diagram show the data flow
in HLPN.
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Table 2. Symbol description used in the mix-context method.
Symbol Description
Reg-Request Request for vehicle registration to TA
VRD Vehicle registration data







SameID Same vehicle (only one vehicle)
RC Vehicle ready to change pseudonym
CPC The cooperative pseudonym change process
ExpiryT Pseudonym expiry time
PEP Pseudonym exchange process
TxN Transmission range neighbors
RSN Random selection of neighbors
PE Pseudonym exchange
BC Broadcast beacon messages
LPN Vehicle license plate number
VID Vehicle identity
PID Pseudo IDs of a vehicle
WT Waiting time
Table 3. Places used in HLPN for mix-context method.
Types Description
ϕ (Reg-Request) P(VID × LPN)
ϕ (VRD) P(VID × PKv × P)
ϕ (Pseudo-Request) P(VID × LPN)
ϕ (PL) P(PID × PKv × P)
ϕ (Road-Condition) P(SPR × D× Tx)
ϕ (SM) P(PID × SP× SPR × D)
ϕ (DC) P(PID × POSVi × POSVj × Dist)
ϕ (NS) P(PID × Tx × Neigh)
ϕ (NC) P(PID × Dist× NeighC)
ϕ (NT) P(PID × NeighC× Dist× Flag)
ϕ (SameID) P(PID × Dist)
ϕ (RC) P(PID × NID × Thresh× Indicator)
ϕ (CPC) P(PID × NID × IndicatorS)
ϕ (PUpdate) P(PID ×WT × Flag)
ϕ (ExpiryT) P(PID × ThreshT ×WT × Flag)
ϕ (PEP) P(PID × NID × Thresh× Indicator)
ϕ (Tx N) P(PID × NID × IndicatorS× RSN)
ϕ (PE) P(PID × NID ×Msgi ×Msgj)
ϕ (BC) P(PID ×MsgPi ×MsgPj)
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Figure 8. HLPN for mix context method.
The vehicle must register with TA before joining the network. For this purpose,
the vehicle requests TA for registration. The TA processes the demand and provides Public
Key (PKv) and pseudonyms (P) in Equation (1). In Equation (2), a vehicle requests a
pseudonym pool if it has expired. To assign the pseudonym pool to a vehicle, the vehicle’s
identity is verified, and the pseudonym pool is assigned to a vehicle as given in Equation (3).
The identity of the vehicle is matched with VID and LPN in the vehicle registration list.
The data in VRD is updated with a pseudonym pool assignment:
R(Registration) = ∀ i2 ∈ x2∧ i3 ∈ x3 | i2[1] 6= i3[1]
∧ x3′ := x3∪ {i2[1], i3[2], i3[3]}.
(1)
R(Pseudo− Registeration) = ∀ i5 ∈ x5∧ i6 ∈ x6 |
Add− request(x6′ := x6∪ {i5[1], i6[1]}).
(2)
R(AssignPool) = ∃ i7 ∈ x7∧ i8 ∈ x8 | compare
(i7[1], i8[1]) = True→ x8′ := x8∧ i8[1].
(3)
After the vehicle registration process, the concerned strategy of mix context is started as
given in Equation (4), where vehicles sense the road conditions. First, vehicles will monitor
the speed using speed check-in Equation (5). If the vehicle speed is in a particular range,
then the distance (Equation (6)) is calculated with its neighboring vehicles. The distance
calculation process takes position coordinates of transmission range vehicles. The vehicle
will select another neighboring vehicle with a minimum distance for mixing road context
information. The minimum distance is checked in (Equation (7)):
R(ApplyStrategy) = ∀ i9 ∈ x9∧ i10 ∈ x10
| RoadCondition(i10[1], i10[2], i10[3])∧
x10′ := x10∪ {i9[1], i10[1]}
(4)
R(SpeedCheck) = ∀ i11 ∈ x11∧ i12 ∈ x12 |
i11[1] ∈ i12[3] ∧ x12′ := x12∪ {i12[1], i12[2]}.
(5)
R(CheckDistance) = ∀ i14 ∈ x14∧ i15 ∈ x15 |
i14[1] ∈ i15[1] ∧ Distance(i15[2], i15[3])→ i15[4].
(6)
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R(MinDist) = ∀ i16 ∈ x16∧ i17 ∈ x17 | (i16[4]
≤ i17[2]) = True→ x17 := x17∪ {i17[3]}.
(7)
After measuring the minimum distance between neighboring vehicles, the neighbor with
minimum distance is selected as given in Equation (8). Next, the number of neighbors
within the transmission range is counted in Equation (10). Certain conditions are required
and, if the condition fails, as given in Equation (9), then finding of neighbors in transmission
range starts again:
R(Selection) = ∀ i19 ∈ x19∧ i20 ∈ x20 | (i19[1] 6= i20[1]
∧i20[2] ≤ 300) = True→ x20′ := x20∪ {i20[3]}.
(8)
R(ConditionF) = ∀ i21 ∈ x21∧ i22 ∈ x22 |
(i21[1] = i22[1]) ∧ ∃ (i22[1] = x22[1]).
(9)
R(Count) = ∀ i25 ∈ x26∧ i26 ∈ x26 | i25[1] 6= i26[1]∧
(i25[3] ≤ 300) = True→ x26′ := x26∪ {i26[2] + +}.
(10)
When the counting of neighbors is complete, the neighbor threshold is checked to determine
the concerned case of mix context. In Equation (11), the neighbor threshold is met, and the
process of cooperative pseudonym changing is circulated in the neighborhood as given in
Equation (12):
R(ThreshSuccess) = ∀ i27 ∈ x27∧ i28 ∈ x28 | (i27[2]
≥ i28[3]) = True→ x28′ := x28∪ {i28[2], i28[4]}.
(11)
R(Circulation) = ∀ i29 ∈ x29∧ i30 ∈ x30 |
(i30[3] = i29[4]) ∧ x30′ := x30∪ {i30[3]}.
(12)
Next, Equation (13) shows the start of cooperative pseudonym updating process, and the
vehicles in the transmission range change their pseudonyms; set a flag to 0 means that
all neighboring vehicles change pseudonyms successfully. A time limit (Equation (20)) is
set for the newly changed pseudonym, and after the pseudonym time expiry, vehicles set
a flag to 1 (Equation (15)), which means that vehicles are ready for another pseudonym
changing process:
R(Updating) = ∀ i31 ∈ x31∧ i32 ∈ x32 | i31[1] =
i32[1]→ x32′ := x32∪ {i32[3] == 0∧ i32[2]}.
(13)
R(TimeLimit) = ∀ i33 ∈ x33∧ i34 ∈ x34 | (i33[2]
≥ i34[2]) = True→ x34′ := x34∪ {i34[3]}.
(14)
R(PseudoExpire) = ∀ i35 ∈ x35∧ i36 ∈ x36 |
(i35[1] = i36[1] ∧ i35[3] ≥ i35[2] = True
→ x36′ = x36∪ {i36[4] == 1}.
(15)
If the neighbor threshold is not met (Equation (16)), then the second case of mix context
is chosen, in which a target vehicle in a vicinity randomly selects a neighboring vehicle
(as given in Equation (17)) for a virtual pseudonym exchange process. The messages are
exchanged between selected neighboring vehicles (Equation (18)) for a pseudonym update
process. Next, vehicles exchange pseudonyms as given in Equation (19). In Equation (20),
again a time limit is set for the expiry of the newly changed pseudonym:
R(ThreshF) = ∀ i37 ∈ x37∧ i38 ∈ x38 | (i37[2] <
i38[3]) = True→ x38′ := x38∪ {i38[2], i38[4]}.
(16)
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R(RandSelection) = ∀ i39 ∈ x39∧ i40 ∈ x40 |
i39[4] = i40[3] ∧ x40′ := x40∪ {i40[4]}.
(17)
R(MsgExchange) = ∀ i41 ∈ x41∧ i42 ∈ x42 |
i f (i42[2] ∈ i41[4]) = True→
x42′ := x42∪ {Exchange(i42[3], i42[4]}.
(18)
R(PseudoExchange) = ∀ i43 ∈ x43∧ i44 ∈ x44 |
Exchange(i43[3], i43[4]) = True→ x44′ := x44
∪{Exchange(i44[2], i44[3])}.
(19)
R(TimeLimit) = ∀ i45 ∈ x45∧ i34 ∈ x34 | (Exchange
(i44[2], i44[3])) = True→ x34′ := x34∪ {i34[3]}.
(20)
6. Experimental Setup
We conducted various simulations of our proposed scheme to analyze its performance
in vehicular networks. This section contains two parts: in the first part, we explain the
simulation environment setup and parameters used in the simulation. In the second part,
we discuss the evaluation metrics used for location privacy.
6.1. Simulation Setup
For the simulation of the proposed CMC scheme, we used Network Simulator 2 (NS2).
The simulation parameters are described in Table 4. We run the simulations for 400 s in an
urban environment. We deploy 200 vehicles on the real world map created with SUMO.
The simulation area is approximately 5249 × 5053 square meters. The speed range is up
to 10 m per second in the road network. We use SUMO for realistic mobility generation
of vehicular networks. The OpenStreet map is used to provide a real world road scenario,
as shown in Figure 9. The map is converted into SUMO to generate vehicle traffic on
a real-world map. The vehicle mobility model file is generated with the help of SUMO.
The simulation is run with diverse vehicle traffic densities.





Bit rate 6 MBPS
Simulation time 400 s
Number of Vehicles 200
Road area 5249 × 5053 m
Speed range 0–10 m/s
MAC protocol IEEE 802.11p
Transmission range 500 m
Beacon interval 300 ms
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Figure 9. Real-world road network scenario using SUMO and OpenStreetMaps.
6.2. Evaluation Criteria
The evaluation criteria used in the majority of the literature are anonymity set size,
entropy, and location traceability. These parameters are used to calculate the privacy
protection level in VANETs. The privacy metrics are given below.
6.2.1. Anonymity Set Size
Anonymity is one of the significant metrics for evaluation of location privacy. It is
the process of the grouping of users of similar status in a vicinity that hides the identity
of a user in the group. Anonymity Set Size (ASS) is defined is the set of users/vehicles,
including target users that are indistinguishable among the group of users. ASS achieves
the anonymisation of the vehicle in a group of vehicles of similar status. In the road
network, ASS is preferred, which hides the actual identities of a target vehicle during
communication. Its value affects the location privacy of vehicles. The higher the ASS,
the higher will be the level of vehicle privacy. We consider the arrival of vehicles at a
particular point at the road is the Poisson process with rate λ and X is a random variable
that denotes the number of vehicles gathered at the congested area for an interval of time
T; then, the probability is calculated as follows [12]:




where λT is the expected number of vehicles that change pseudonyms cooperatively. This
can improve the anonymity of vehicles in the vicinity by updating pseudonyms at the same
time. Hence, the expected number of vehicles during the time T is denoted as:







e−(λT) = λT. (22)
After the computation of probability and the expected number of vehicles at a certain time,














where ViPCj is the number of vehicle update pseudonyms that anonymize the target vehicle
in the region.
6.2.2. Entropy
The entropy is used to evaluate the level of privacy of vehicles in the network. It
calculates the degree of uncertainty in information from an adversary’s perspective by
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linking various pseudonyms of a vehicle during communication and the pseudonym
changing process. This measures the level of privacy achieved or anonymisation of vehicles.
Let Vx be a set of vehicles that may be taking part in the pseudonym changing procedure,
and Vy is a set of vehicles that successfully changed pseudonyms. Let P(Vx→Vy) be the
probability of mapping the number of vehicles to the number of pseudonyms changed.
The uniform probability of distribution evaluates the higher level of entropy and higher
confusion for an adversary to identify the target vehicle. Consider the number of vehicles
that have changed pseudonyms at time t; the entropy can be calculated as follows [12]:
Ht = ∑
Vx ,Vy∈V
PVx →Vy log2PVx →Vy . (24)
where Ht is the entropy of vehicles anonymisation in the concerned area, and V is the total
number of vehicles taking part in the pseudonym changing process. The average entropy






Traceability is another privacy metric that measures the tracking percentage of vehicles
during a trip. It is inverse to the level of location privacy. It is the probability of an adversary
determining the location spots of the vehicles. Let Tv be the tracing probability of an attacker
itself, a measure of anonymity set. Traceability can be defined as given below [42]:
Tv = [1− Pr(|ASS|)]. (26)
Pr is the probability of vehicle anonymisation during the pseudonym change process.
The value of Tv equal to 1 means that the adversary successfully tracked the target ve-
hicle by linking its various pseudonym during various location spots. With increasing
anonymisation, the traceability strength of an adversary reduces over time.
7. Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the proposed scheme’s performance with the help of
various experimental results. First, we discuss the performance of CMC under various
traffic densities with the pseudonym update process. The proposed scheme CMC consists
of both pseudonym change and exchange processes under diverse traffic conditions. We
analyzed the anonymisation with the pseudonym change and exchange process as shown
in Figure 10. During the pseudonym changing process, vehicles with high traffic density,
i.e., have a higher number of neighbors in transmission range, the anonymisation of
vehicles is improved. The pseudonym exchange process has lower anonymity due to fewer
neighbors in transmission range. Depending on the process of pseudonyms update under
various vehicle traffic conditions, the vehicle identity anonymisation is certainly different.
A higher number of vehicles in a region that can change pseudonyms cooperatively will
improve identity protection. Figure 11 shows the number of pseudonyms updated for
various vehicle densities. We take two traffic densities. The lower traffic density case
contains fewer vehicles in a road region, while higher density means a higher number of
transmission range vehicles, as given in [52]. A higher number of vehicles taking part in
the pseudonym update process increases identity protection. The figure clearly shows
that a higher number of pseudonyms are updated during higher traffic conditions, which
improves the anonymity of a vehicle in the crowd.


































































Figure 11. The number of pseudonyms updates at various vehicle densities.
8. Performance Comparison of CMC with Existing Schemes
The results of the proposed scheme CMC with existing schemes IndMZ [24] and
TAPCS [25] in terms of ASS, entropy, and location traceability. The reason for choosing
these two techniques is the similarity with our proposed scheme working with vehicle
traffic conditions and used for privacy protection of vehicles in a road network environment.
The values collected during simulations for anonymity set and entropy are given in Table 5.
If a higher number of pseudonyms are changed by vehicles in a region, the target vehicle
anonymisation is increased which ultimately increases entropy and confusion for an
adversary to exploit the actual identity and location of a target vehicle. The location privacy
scheme intends to create uncertainty in location information to generate confusion for an
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adversary. Here, confusion means adding uncertainty in the vehicle location information
for an adversary that makes it difficult to identify a vehicle by linking old pseudonyms with
newly changed pseudonyms. The uncertainty can be produced by the proper pseudonyms
changing process. The proposed scheme CMC improves entropy and increases confusion
for an adversary when compared with existing schemes IndMZ [24] and TAPCS [25] as
shown in the table. The average ASS is evaluated based on vehicle density and simulation
time. Figures 12 and 13 show the proposed scheme’s results in comparison to existing
schemes for vehicle anonymisation. CMC improves vehicle anonymity over IndMZ and
TAPCS. The reason behind this is the efficient management of vehicles that took part in
the pseudonym update process. Initially, the anonymity is low due to a smaller number
of transmission range vehicles. After some time, the anonymity of vehicles increases due
to the successful change of pseudonyms. In Figure 13, the proposed scheme’s behavior is
slightly undulating due to the lack of vehicle interest in cooperation with neighbors in the
region. However, the overall process moves towards improvement in the anonymisation
of vehicles.
Table 5. Values collected during simulations.
Number of Vehicles Number of Pseudonyms Changed Entropy of ASS Adversary Confusion
CMC
100 71 8 40%
200 169 14.7 70%
TAPCS [25]
100 51 6.5 32%
200 135 12.6 56%
IndMZ [24]
100 36 4.8 14%
































Figure 12. Average anonymity versus time.




































Figure 13. Anonymisation of vehicle identity at different vehicles’ density.
Figure 14 shows the entropy of average anonymity set size at a certain time. The pro-
posed scheme CMC beats the existing schemes TAPCS and IndMZ in terms of entropy. This
shows the confusion generated concerning the target vehicle in the pseudonym updating
process. CMC produces greater confusion than existing schemes for an adversary to find a
target vehicle’s actual identity in the communicating region. Ultimately, it improves the
privacy protection level of vehicles. Similarly, in Figure 15, entropy is evaluated based
on the number of vehicles took part in the pseudonym changing process. The entropy
shows irregular behavior at different traffic densities; this is due to the lack of cooperation
of vehicles in that region for the anonymisation process. CMC achieves higher confu-
sion than TAPCS and IndMZ in various vehicle traffic. The achievement of the proposed
CMC scheme regarding entropy is because of the efficient utilization of road context and
pseudonym updating process. The IndMZ [24] generates fake pseudonyms in an indi-
vidual manner and so the target vehicle can be easily identified by an adversary, which
reduces the confusion level. The reduced performance of TAPCS compared with CMC
regarding entropy is due to inefficient management of the pseudonym changing process in
the silent period.
The vehicle tracking percentage during simulation time is shown in Figure 16. Initially,
the proposed scheme CMC and TAPCS have similar tracking ratios at a certain amount
of time. Over time, CMC reduces vehicle traceability for an adversary. The proposed
scheme gets better results regarding reducing vehicle tracking probability compared with
existing methods TAPCS [25] and IndMZ [24]. Similarly, tracking probability concerning
the number of vehicles is shown in Figure 17. While there is a low number of vehicles at the
start of the network, the tracking probability is also high. Whenever the number of vehicles
is increasing, tracking probability is reduced to a certain level. CMC has a lower tracking
percentage compared to existing schemes. The proposed scheme efficiently manages
the road environment and makes use of any neighbor’s cooperation in the pseudonym
changing process, increasing the confusion for an adversary to track the pseudo-identities
of vehicles.
































































Figure 15. Entropy with different vehicle traffic density.















































































Figure 17. Tracking probability of the number of vehicles.
9. Analysis and Discussion
This section discusses the CMC’s general security against GPA, the proposed scheme’s
impact, and its computation overhead. The details are given below.
9.1. Protection against GPA
The GPA can cover a large part of the network to capture beacon messages broadcast by
vehicles. GPA analyzes the beacon messages for pseudo-identities of vehicles and matches
them with old pseudonyms. If the adversary successfully matches these pseudonyms, then
it can identify vehicles at various visited locations. Here, we examine the strength of GPA
to extract the identity of a target vehicle. We investigate the strength of GPA with and
without additional knowledge about a target vehicle. The additional information about the
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target vehicle may be collected at some road intersections or frequently visited locations.
The information may be vehicle frequently visited roads, old pseudonyms, and location of
interest. Based on this information, the adversary tries to match the pseudonyms of a target
vehicle at the earlier locations with pseudonyms changed at the new visited locations.
This knowledge improves an adversary’s strength to identify a target, which may be used
for matching vehicle pseudonyms. Figure 18 shows the average confusion per trace of
GPA with and without additional knowledge. The GPA with additional knowledge has
lower confusion in identifying a vehicle, and without additional knowledge, confusion is
increasing at a higher rate. Our proposed scheme CMC increases an adversary’s confusion
with additional information because it efficiently mixes the vehicle context under diverse
traffic conditions. Similarly, Figure 19 shows the confusion for both GPA with and without
additional knowledge under different vehicle traffic densities. The increasing number
of vehicles improves the average confusion rate for the GPA. Eventually, it increases the





























GPA without additional knowledge
GPA with additional knowledge


































GPA without additional knowledge
GPA with additional knowledge
Figure 19. Adversary confusion with a different number of vehicles.
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9.2. Impact on VANETs Applications
We analyze the impact of location privacy scheme on the vehicular network appli-
cations that may be safety-related and comfort applications. Achieving a higher level of
privacy certainly will need to reduce its impact on road network applications. However,
dummy data or wrong information is disseminated in the network for anonymizing a
vehicle, which significantly reduces the application services of the vehicular network.
Supposing inaccurate information is circulated, how would the vehicles efficiently uti-
lize the applications of VANETs? The existing scheme IndMZ [24] takes the help of fake
pseudonyms to anonymize the vehicles. This scheme falls into two problems. The first
one is the computation burden on the vehicles. Secondly, it affects safety applications.
The generation of fake pseudonyms for anonymisation reduces the application service qual-
ity. A large number of fake pseudonyms may also suffer communication among vehicles.
The TAPCS [25] scheme is based on the radio silence period to preserve vehicles’ location
privacy. The use of silence periods during communication networks such as in VANETs is
dangerous for vehicles’ safety. During silent modes, mobile nodes do not broadcast road
network information such as emergency, accident, the danger of lane changing, etc., and
how the other vehicles will know about the road status information at a certain period.
Safety application is critical, and delays in information dissemination compromise driver
safety on the road. Thus, the TAPCS has a higher impact on road safety applications
than the proposed scheme CMC. There is no concept of a silent period and generation of
fake pseudonyms in our scheme CMC that impact road safety and comfort application.
CMC disseminates road status information on a timely basis and utilizes road context
information for vehicle anonymisation. CMC reduces privacy impact on safety applications
compared with IndMZ and TAPCS.
9.3. Computation Overhead
The vehicle computation time for the pseudonyms changing process is analyzed in
this section. Figure 20 shows the average computation time of the proposed scheme CMC
using number of neighbors in the transmission range. A higher number of transmission
range neighbors will take more time to compute the pseudonyms changing process as
compared to lower transmission range neighbors. At the start of the simulation, there is
a lower number of transmission range neighbors and a lower computation burden on the
vehicles for the pseudonym changing process. The proposed scheme’s average computation
cost is compared with TAPCS [25] and IndMZ [24], as in Figure 21. The CMC creates a
lower computation overhead than existing schemes. This is because of the utilization of
road context information and pseudonym changing process for vehicle anonymisation.
IndMZ scheme produces a much higher computation cost due to the generation of fake
pseudonyms in larger quantities. The TAPCS generates a lower cost of computation than
IndMZ by utilizing the vehicle traffic conditions in the road environment, although the
proposed scheme CMC has a lower computation overhead as compared with the existing
scheme. However, this overhead can be reduced further to optimize the computation and
communication time of vehicles by applying a privacy scheme.
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Figure 21. Average computation cost with a various number of vehicles.
9.4. Privacy and Traffic Optimization
The majority of the research conducted for location privacy protection in VANETs
is based on the pseudonyms’ changing process. The design of the privacy scheme may
have an impact on the performance of other fields of the VANETs. One consideration is the
impact on communication protocols, high frequency of changing pseudonym improves
privacy but creates complications for the routing protocols. It degrades the performance
of communication protocols that may impact the packet delivery ratio. The impact of
the pseudonym changing process discussed in [67] on the packet delivery ratio is as
follows: if vehicles (nodes) change their pseudonyms after every five seconds, the packet
delivery ratio is about 60% to the destination. If pseudonyms are changed after every
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10 s, the successful packet delivery ratio is about above 75%, while increasing duration to
30 s successful delivery ratio becomes above 85%. However, the increasing duration for
pseudonym changes will reduce the level of privacy. Thus, there should be a reasonable
balance between privacy protection and traffic optimization.
10. Conclusions
This paper takes on the problem of location privacy in a vehicular network. We have
proposed a new Crowd-based Mix Context (CMC) scheme for location privacy preservation
in the vehicular network. CMC employs vehicle speed, direction, and traffic density for the
pseudonym changing process. Based on these parameters, the vehicles update pseudonyms
simultaneously, which creates confusion for an adversary to break the pseudonyms of
vehicles at different location spots. We formally model and analyze the proposed scheme
using HLPN. The evaluation results show that CMC improves the anonymisation of
vehicles compared with existing schemes IndMZ and TAPCS at various traffic densities.
This prevents the adversary from linking pseudonyms of vehicles and identifies a target
vehicle in the road region. The proposed scheme reduced the computation burden on
vehicles for generating fake pseudonyms in the existing methods. The CMC also minimizes
the impact of anonymisation on safety applications by managing road context information.
In the future, we are eager to do more experiments on the vehicle high speed and low
traffic density and will determine a robust privacy preservation method in such a dynamic
road network condition.
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